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SILENCE SHOULD NOT SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS:
THE USE OF PRE-ARREST, PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE OF GUILT
Lisa Savadjian*
Introduction
On January 11, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Salinas v. Texas, a case in
which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest court for criminal cases in Texas, held
that the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination did not extend to a
defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.1 In 1992, Houston police officers discovered two
homicide victims and their investigation led to defendant Genovevo Salinas.2 Salinas did not
respond in the face of questioning that purportedly connected him to the murders.3 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that, at the defendant’s trial in the 230th District Court, the
prosecution could comment on the defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, even though the
defendant did not testify.4 The issue certified to the Supreme Court was “[w]hether or under
what circumstances the Fifth Amendment's Self-incrimination Clause protects a defendant's

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Pepperdine University.
1
Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. granted, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 928 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 12–246). Genovevo Salinas was convicted of murder and appealed the use of his silence as
substantive evidence of his guilt at trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that Salinas’ interaction with
police officers was not compelled in the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda circumstances and therefore the Fifth Amendment
did not apply to statements he had allegedly made to officers because such statements were not compelled selfincrimination. Id.
2
Id.
3
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Salinas v. Texas, No. 12-246, WL 3645103, at *5 (2012). The prosecutor
commented on the defendant’s silence and insinuated that an innocent man would immediately dispel having any
connection to the crime.
“The police asked the defendant if a shotgun recovered from his home would match casings found by the
bodies at the crime scene, to which defendant did not respond. The police officer testified that he wouldn’t
answer that question . . . You know, if you asked somebody - there is a murder in New York City, is your
gun going to match up the murder in New York City? Is your DNA going to be on that body or that
person's fingernails? Is [sic] your fingerprints going to be on that body? You are going to say no. An
innocent person is going to say: What are you talking about? I didn't do that. I wasn’t there. He didn’t
respond that way. He didn’t say: No, it’s not going to match up. It’s my shotgun. It’s been in our house.
What are you talking about? He wouldn’t answer that question.”
4
Salinas, 369 S.W.3d at 179.
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refusal to answer police questioning before he has been arrested or read his Miranda rights.”5 In
the state case, the court wrestled with the federal constitutional right against self-incrimination
encompassed in the Fifth Amendment.6
Even though Miranda 7 warnings should normally precede custodial interrogation and
inform a defendant of his right to remain silent in the face of that interrogation, government
attorneys, as well as state prosecutors, argue that a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda8 silence
during informal, non-custodial encounters with law enforcement demonstrates substantive
evidence his guilt.9 The use of this silence presents a unique problem as it is distinct from any
other type of silence the Supreme Court has addressed before. In Doyle v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court grappled with the issue of whether post-arrest, post-Miranda silence could be used for
impeachment.10 There, the Court held that the defendant’s silence following arrest and receipt of
the Miranda warnings carries an implied assurance that it will not be used against him. 11
Prosecutors were therefore barred from commenting on such silence.12 In Griffin v. California,
the Supreme Court further prohibited the use of post-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant on
his decision not to testify at trial.13 There, the prosecution directly addressed the defendant’s
silence during his trial, which led to his first-degree murder conviction.14 The Supreme Court

5

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art I, § 10 (“[The accused] shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself . . .”).
7
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); see infra Part I-B.
8
The term “pre-arrest, pre-Miranda” refers to the period before a suspect has been arrested and received his
Miranda warnings.
9
Mikah K. Story Thompson, Methinks the Lady Doth Protest Too Little: Reassessing the Probative Value of
Silence, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 21, 21 (2008) (“The syllogism goes as follows: major premise - Innocent people
proclaim their innocence in response to an accusation; minor premise - Defendant failed to respond to an officer’s
accusation that he killed his wife; conclusion - Defendant is guilty of killing his wife. This syllogism is the basis
upon which courts and lawmakers allow a defendant’s silence to be admitted into evidence as proof of guilt.”).
10
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
11
Id. at 614 (“It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.”).
12
Id.
13
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
14
Id.
6
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held that the Fifth Amendment forbid prosecutors from commenting at trial on the accused’s
refusal to testify, because a “comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the inquisitorial
system of criminal justice, which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.”15 Yet, a defendant’s pre-arrest,
pre-Miranda silence is inherently distinct from cases like Doyle and Griffin where, like in
Salinas, the defendant does not testify and the prosecutor does not seek to impeach the defendant
with the silence, but rather presents the silence as substantive evidence for the jury to consider
when weighing the defendant’s guilt.
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Salinas v. Texas represents the first step in
clarifying the issue of whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive
evidence of a defendant’s guilt. It follows many years of conflict and divergent opinions from
the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals.16 Several circuits hold that using pre-arrest silence
as substantive evidence of guilt violates the privilege against self-incrimination; several others
hold that it does not; and some address the use of post-arrest silence in the same discussion.17
This Comment recommends that the Supreme Court in Salinas v. Texas adopt the rule of
law announced by the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, which all hold that the
government may not use pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in its case-in-chief because the use of

15

Id. at 614.
The Supreme Court has previously rejected certiorari in numerous cases presenting this very issue. See United
States v. Ashley, 664 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1651 (2012). It is possible the Supreme
Court did not take certiorari because Ashley was not viewed as the “perfect” case to decide the issue, due to the fact
that no new information was provided by the admission of Ashley’s silence and the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it
was harmless error. Ashley, 664 F.3d at 605. The circuit court explained: “We need not take any position regarding
the split in order to resolve the case before us. Even assuming arguendo that the government impermissibly used
Ashley's pre-arrest, pre–Miranda silence, the error was harmless, because the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Id. at 604. See also United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1078 (1994); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997 (1992); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1031 (1992); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1565 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989).
17
See infra Part I-C-2.
16
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such silence violates a defendant’s right to remain silent.18 These holdings recognize that while
Miranda warnings provide additional protection to defendants, they do not create and are not
necessary to the existence of the right to remain silent. Part I-A will explore the development of
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Part I-B will discuss the pioneer case of
the debate, Miranda v. Arizona,19 Part I-C will discuss exceptions to Miranda, Part I-D-1 will
address the relevant Supreme Court holdings on the issue of silence and Part I-D-2 will discuss
the current circuit split regarding the use of a defendant’ pre-Miranda silence as substantive
evidence in a prosecutor’s case-in-chief to prove a defendant’s guilt. Part II will then argue that,
in light of the Court’s tendency to exclude this evidence in factually similar cases, the Supreme
Court should follow in the footsteps of the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Savory v.
Lane20 by interpreting this silence according to the Griffin v. California precedent.21 Part III will
conclude that it is unconstitutional to allow the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence to be used against him at trial as substantive evidence of his guilt as it is contrary to the
Fifth Amendment and will urge for a reversal of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision
in Salinas v. Texas.
I. Historical Background
A. Fifth Amendment History
One of the most fundamental rights incorporated into the Bill of Rights is the Fifth
Amendment, which provides in relevant part that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any

18

Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991); Coppola
v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (1987).
19
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20
United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (1987) (relying upon Griffin to conclude that a
defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence could not be used as direct evidence of guilt because the right to remain
silent attaches before the adversarial proceedings even begin).
21
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–15 (1965) (holding that a defendant should not be penalized for
exercising a constitutional privilege, and thus, a defendant’s choice not to testify at trial cannot be used against the
defendant as evidence of guilt either by the prosecutor in closing argument or the court in jury instructions).
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criminal case to be a witness against himself.”22 It is more than likely that most people in the
United States have heard about Miranda v. Arizona, a case interpreting the Fifth Amendment that
has since become embedded into American law, politics, and culture.23 Anyone who has seen a
movie about crime, or watched police television dramas, knows that a defendant has the right to
remain silent when arrested.24 Even if people are unaware that Miranda stems from the Fifth
Amendment, they generally know that, if they are arrested and questioned by the police, they
have the right to remain silent and to request a lawyer.25 This basic right is such a fundamental
element of our justice system, so universally well known, that even children are indoctrinated
into understanding its meaning at a young age.26
To begin the discussion about the protections of the Fifth Amendment, it is helpful to
look back to its inception. English common law laid the foundation for the American right
against self-incrimination.27 Dating back to thirteenth century England, Pope Innocent III

22

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Laurie Magid, The Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present, and Future A Review of the Miranda Debate: Law,
Justice, and Policing, Edited by Richard A. Leo and George C. Thomas III, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1251, 1314 n. 6
(1999) (“The Miranda decision is so well known that it has spawned an entire lexicon of new words and phrases:
‘Miranda warnings,’ ‘Miranda rights, ‘Miranda waivers,’ ‘to Mirandize,’ and to ‘get Miranda’d.’”).
24
See Joshua A. Engel, Frequent Fliers at the Court: The Supreme Court Begins to Take the Experience of Criminal
Defendants into Account in Miranda Cases, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 303, 340 n. 25 (2011) (citing United States
v. Harris, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“As every television viewer knows, an officer ordinarily may not
interrogate a suspect who is in custody without informing her of her Miranda rights.”); United States v. DeNoyer,
811 F.2d 436, 439 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that term “Miranda Warnings” “is commonly used, both in court and
in television shows, to describe the ritual prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona”); United States v. Lacy, No. 2:09-CR45 TS, 2010 WL 1451344, at *2 (D. Utah, Apr. 8, 2010) (defendant testified “that he was very aware of his Miranda
rights because of television”); Russell Dean Covey, Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a
Constitutional Revolution, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 761, 761 (2007) (“Not only did television make the Miranda warnings
famous, its adoption of Miranda as an icon of criminal procedure may be main the reason Miranda is good law
today.”)).
25
Id. (citing THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING xv (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III
eds., 1998) (reporting that 64.5% of parolees in one study demonstrated their knowledge of the Miranda warnings by
correctly answering eleven or twelve out of twelve test questions)).
26
See Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000,
1000 (2001) (suggesting that schoolchildren are more familiar with the Miranda warnings than they are with
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address).
27
JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2250, at 267–70 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed.,
1961).
23
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authorized the use of an oath de veritate dicenda in the religious trials of the era.28 The oath
required the defendant to swear that he would truthfully answer all questions, which was used to
force self-incrimination.29 If the person did not swear the oath, he would be found guilty. Yet if
he answered and denied the charges, he was convicted of perjury.30
Ironically, the absence of a right against self-incrimination in early English law’s served
to enshrine it as a primary right in American jurisprudence. In the seventeenth century, the Star
Chamber Court of England used the de veritate dicenda oath to create the oath ex officio.31 The
oath was a weapon, used as coercion, persecution and forcible self-incrimination.32 The oath
was to be given by the accused prior to questioning by the Star Chamber, made to answer
questions truthfully.33 But after John Lilburn was whipped in 1837 as a result of his famous
refusal to participate in the Star Chamber Oath to face charges for heresy and sedition, the
resulting public outcry led to the abolition of the oath.34
As a response to these abuses, the common law right against self-incrimination evolved
from the maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, which means “no man shall be compelled to
criminate himself.” 35 Also establishing the groundwork for the right was the theory that a
defendant is always faced with a “cruel trilemma,” which prompted the need for protection.36
Officers create the predicament of the “cruel trilemma” where a prisoner must choose between

28

Leonard Levy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 431 (1968).
Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1346 (1959).
30
Id.
31
Mary A. Shein, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Seige: Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 503, 503 (1993) (noting history of state abuse behind drafting of privilege); LEVY, supra note 28, at 272–81.
32
Id.
33
8 WIGMORE, supra note 27.
34
Jan Martin Rybnicek, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't?: The Absence of A Constitutional Protection
Prohibiting the Admission of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 405, 410 (2009)
35
See John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 71 (1891).
36
See Andrew J. M. Bentz, The Original Public Meaning of the Fifth Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA.
L. REV. 897, 899-900 (2012) (“The cruel trilemma is the decision a defendant would face if forced to choose
between maintaining her silence and being held in contempt of court, or speaking and thereby either perjuring or
incriminating herself.”); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
29
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testifying and either perjuring or incriminating himself, or remaining silent and being held in
contempt of court.37
From this rich history, the American privilege against self-incrimination developed
during the settlement of the nation’s thirteen colonies.38 The Founding Fathers of America
appreciated the British common law right to remain silent that existed to protect the individual
from the aggressive inquisitorial examinations by religious institutions.39 Before the privilege
was incorporated into the Constitution by way of the Bill of Rights in 1791, it appeared in early
versions America’s governing documents.40 From this, the Framers thus relied on this history of
abuse, the common law privilege that they left behind in England, and their early governing
documents when constructing the Fifth Amendment as it exists today, preserving one’s
autonomy in prosecutions.41 The Supreme Court recognized the remarkable evolution of the
right and commented in a late 19th century case, Bram v. United States, that the “maxim, which
in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability
of a constitutional enactment.”42
The Fifth Amendment evolved as a result of the Founder’s concern for the possibility of

37

See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L.
REV. 671, 694-95 (1968) (discussing the cruel trilemma).
38
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 446 (1956) (“The Framers . . . created the federally protected right of
silence and decreed that the law could not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a witness against himself. A
long history and a deep sentiment lay behind this decision. Some of those who came to these shores were Puritans
who had known the hated oath ex officio used both by the Star Chamber and the High Commission.”).
39
Andrew J.M. Bentz, Note, The Original Public Meaning of the Fifth Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98
VA. L. REV. 897, 909 (2012) (citing A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO FRANCE 79-84 (John Simpson trans., 1914)).
40
Congress ratified the Bill of Rights in 1791, including the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
See U.S. Const. amend. V. Before that, a version of the right was included in Virginia’s Declaration of Rights in
1776, which was drafted by George Mason three weeks before the Declaration of Independence. James Madison
used the Virginia Declaration of Rights as a model for drafting the Bill of Rights. United States v. Hubbell, 530
U.S. 27, 52 (2000).
41
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 248 (1972) (explaining that the privilege was adopted by the drafters of the Bill of
Rights “not only (as) an answer to numerous instances of colonial misrule but (as) a shield against ‘the evils that
lurk(ed) in the shadows of a new and untried sovereignty.”).
42
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 545 (1897).
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an overwhelming and oppressive government and to protect the citizens of the fledgling nation.43
The rights contained in the Fifth Amendment represent five distinct liberties that the Framers
intended as safeguards from the abuses of authority they had left in England.44 With regard to
the self-incrimination provision specifically, the Supreme Court has explained that two of the
policy concerns underlying the privilege were a commitment to the adversarial system of justice
and a desire to protect the innocent rather than punish the guilty.45 These are especially relevant
to the Court’s determination in Salinas v. Texas, for in the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence
context, both of these values are implicated and jeopardized.46
In the early twentieth century leading up to Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court
explored numerous cases regarding confessions obtained through the use of force and thereby set
the standards for considering whether those confessions were given voluntarily without force or
coercion.47 In Counselman v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court explained that a defendant has the
privilege against testifying under oath and making incriminating statements against himself at
trial.48 Such compelled confessions were a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s right against selfincrimination.49 Five years later, the Supreme Court refined the voluntariness test by holding
that involuntary confessions were inadmissible as evidence under the Fifth Amendment in Bram
43

Aktil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
See Ralph Rossum, “SELF-INCRIMINATION”: THE ORIGINAL INTENT, IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING
AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 273, 278 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991). These include: the right to be indicted
by an impartial Grand Jury before being tried for a federal criminal offense, the right to be free from multiple
prosecutions or punishments for a single criminal offense, the right to remain silent when prosecuted for a criminal
offense, the right to have personal liberties protected by due process of law, and the right to receive just
compensation when the government takes private property for public use.
45
See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (listing the purposes of the privilege).
46
See Jane Elinor Notz, Prearrest Silence As Evidence of Guilt: What You Don't Say Shouldn't Be Used Against
You, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1020 (1997) (“. . . Allowing prosecutorial use of such silence as evidence of guilt
would favor the state in its competition against the individual. If a defendant knows that her prearrest silence may be
used against her at trial, she is more likely to speak with the police earlier. On [protecting the innocent], a defendant
may remain silent not because she is guilty, but because she is shy, afraid, or inarticulate.”).
47
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it
was voluntarily made is to exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked to determine whether the inducement to speak
was such that there is a fair risk the confession is false.”).
48
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
49
Id. at 586.
44
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v. United States.50 There, the Court embraced the factor of “voluntariness” as the key to whether
an admission violated Fifth Amendment due process. 51

With the decision in Brown v.

Mississippi, the trend of considering voluntariness continued.52 The Brown Court concluded that
a defendant’s confession that was extracted by police violence through whippings and torture
could not be entered as evidence as it violated the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the state
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 Spano v. New York represented the
movement of the Court’s jurisprudence away from the amorphous “voluntariness” standard, the
former touchstone for determining whether police violated due process standards when eliciting
confessions, towards the modern rule in Miranda v. Arizona.54 There, the Court focused less on
extraneous factors such as meals provided to the accused, and more on whether the accused had
access to legal counsel when judging the admissibility of confessions.55
While the 1964 case Escobedo v. Illinois introduced the right to counsel in the preindictment stage as a limit on interrogation, it was also a step towards Miranda. 56 Justice
Goldberg, writing for the majority, held that the admission into evidence of statements made in
the course of a custodial interrogation and after a suspect had requested but was denied counsel,
was a violation of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, even if the suspect
voluntarily made the statements.57 Relevant to the current analysis, the Court abandoned the
traditional due process, voluntary-involuntary test for confessions and instead held that where a
suspect is denied a lawyer and is not informed “of his absolute constitutional right to remain

Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (“A confession can never be in evidence where prisoner has been
influenced by any threat or promise, human minds under pressure.”).
51
Id. at 542.
52
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
53
Id. at 287.
54
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
55
Id. at 324.
56
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1968).
57
Id. at 490–91.
50
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silent,” it is a violation of the Sixth Amendment.58 Two short years later, the Supreme Court
clarified whether the Fifth Amendment as well protected these rights in Miranda v. Arizona.
B. Arriving at Miranda
In 1966, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona,59 which
dramatically changed the manner in which custodial interrogations took place in America.
Miranda would soon become, by the Supreme Court’s own acknowledgement, one of the most
well known criminal justice decisions in American jurisprudence.60 The Miranda Court held that
the “Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the
expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will
not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a
warning being given.”61 The Court emphasized that state legislatures could write laws that had
different standards,62 but suggested that jurisdictions use the warning: “You have the right to
remain silent. Anything you say or do can and will be held against you in a court of law. You
have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you.”63
When the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona in 1966, the Justices limited the
holding to confessions obtained through abusive police tactics during custodial interrogation.64
Two years prior, the Court’s holding in Escobedo v. Illinois had failed to address the issue of
admissibility of improperly obtained confessions.65 The Miranda case was a consolidation of
previous cases in which each defendant provided inculpatory statements to police offers while

58

Id. at 491.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
60
See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) ( “Miranda has become embedded in routine police
practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”).
61
Id. at 468.
62
Id. at 467.
63
Id. at 479.
64
Id.
65
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1968).
59
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unaware of their constitutional rights to remain silent. 66 The man who would become the
namesake of the right, Ernesto Miranda, had been arrested and interrogated for two hours
regarding a kidnapping and rape.67 After reciting a dense history of the Fifth Amendment and
contemporary abuses of police power, the Court held that it was necessary to have a safeguard to
prevent against compelled confessions.68
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority and found that Ernesto Miranda had
been subjected to questioning in a “police-dominated atmosphere . . . cut off from the outside
world . . . without full warnings of [his] constitutional rights.”69 The Court ruled that “if a person
in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal
terms that he has the right to remain silent,”70 and a person in custody “must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during
interrogation.” 71 The privilege is fulfilled only when the person is “guaranteed the right to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.”72
Justice Harlan’s dissent, joined by Justices Stewart and White, firmly stated that Miranda
was a poorly crafted decision by constitutional law standards and the severity of the mistake in
constitutional law was incalculable.

73

Justice Clark wrote a separate dissent, which

recommended a “totality of the circumstances” approach, a standard where the state would have
the burden to prove that, in light of all factors, the confession was clearly made voluntarily.74
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440 (“We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois . . .
There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him
in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to
remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney.”).
67
Id. at 491–92.
68
Id. at 460–61.
69
Id. at 445.
70
Id. at 467–68.
71
Id. at 471.
72
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
73
Id. at 504 (Harlan J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 501–03 (Clark, J., dissenting).
66
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Miranda mandated that statements made by criminal suspects in custody could not be
used unless police officers first gave a warning to the suspect. 75

These warnings, now

colloquially known as “Miranda warnings,” were thought to be necessary to inform a defendant
of his rights in the inherently coercive atmosphere during interrogation.76 A police officer is not
required to inform a suspect of his Miranda rights until the police interrogation begins.77 A
criminal defendant must be both in custody and subjected to interrogation for Miranda to
apply.78 Yet the doctrine does require that a person in custody be advised that:
[H]e has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.”79
Miranda announced that when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation, his
statements are inadmissible as substantive proof of his guilt unless he voluntarily and knowingly
waives his rights after the police advise him of his rights. 80 This ambition to fully inform
suspects of their rights made Miranda the seminal Fifth Amendment decision it is because the
Court stopped interpreting confessions under Due Process claims and instead shifted squarely
into a Fifth Amendment analysis, where the very act of improper questioning of a suspect would
be a constitutional violation, no matter if the confession was voluntary.81
As ground breaking as Miranda was, almost immediately, it was met with heavy
resistance by Congress82 and sparked tension with other Supreme Court Justices.83 At the time

75

Id. at 444.
Id. at 444–45.
77
Id.
78
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994).
79
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
80
Id. at 468.
81
David S. Romantz, “You Have the Right to Remain Silent”: A Case for the Use of Silence As Substantive Proof of
the Criminal Defendant's Guilt, 38 IND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
82
See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1968).
76

12

of the Court’s decision, no state had ever compelled adherence to any rule comparable to
Miranda, as most states still applied a standard that analyzed the voluntariness of a defendant’s
confession.84 As a result, most politicians and police officers condemned the Miranda decision
as a judicially crafted vehicle to allow criminals avoid prosecution for their crimes.85
Intent on superseding Miranda legislatively, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 two years after Miranda.86 Under Section 3501 of the Act,
the statute made the admissibility of confessions turn on an analysis of voluntariness. 87
Government agents were therefore allowed to ignore Miranda’s admonition to read warnings to
a defendant upon his arrest.88 The statute directed federal trial judges to admit statements of
criminal defendants if they were made voluntarily, without any regard to whether the defendant
had received his Miranda warnings. 89 Voluntariness depended on such things as: the time
between arrest and arraignment, whether the defendant knew the crime for which he had been
arrested, whether he had been told that he did not have to talk to the police and that any
statement could be used against him, whether the defendant knew prior to questioning that he
had the right to the assistance of counsel, and whether he actually had the assistance of counsel
83
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during questioning. 90 But, the “presence or absence of any of” these factors “need not be
conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.”91 Because Section 3501 was an Act
of Congress, it applied only to federal prosecutions and prosecutions in the District of Columbia,
so individual states were still free to follow the Miranda approach instead.92
The statute was nevertheless all but forgotten about in the following years.93 Although he
signed the bill into law, President Lyndon B. Johnson was unhappy with the prospect of losing
Miranda’s protections and directed the FBI to continue informing suspects of their rights. 94
Even Attorney General Ramsey Clark instructed prosecutors to only offer into evidence
confessions obtained under Miranda’s guidelines.95 After President Richard Nixon was elected
following a campaign heavily focused on combatting crime, his Attorney General, John Mitchell,
directed federal prosecutors and agents to follow the Miranda rules, but to also use Section 3501
to help obtain the admission of confessions.96 While the Department of Justice generally viewed
Section 3501 as constitutional, the Department’s sporadic enforcement of it in the circuits over
the years left the Courts free to use Miranda instead.97
The constitutionality of the Act was not ruled upon until nearly 30 years later in
Dickerson v. United States, where the Court confronted the fight over Miranda and chose the
proper standard to apply to confessions.98 There, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to
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commit bank robbery and other offenses and the district court granted a motion to suppress the
defendant’s statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation because he had not received his
Miranda warnings, and the Fourth Circuit reversed because his statement was voluntary.99 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 7-2 majority, held that Miranda’s warnings-based approach to
determining the admissibility of a statement made by accused during custodial interrogation was
constitutionally based, and could not be overruled by a legislative act.100 In reaching this
conclusion, Rehnquist hearkened back to the history before and after Miranda with a survey of
the privilege against self-incrimination, dating back to English common law.101 Rehnquist
concluded that Congress has the authority to pass statutes to protect the right against coercive
self-incrimination, but warned that such legislation must be at least as effective in informing
individuals of their rights as Miranda.102
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, explaining in dissent that the “judgment
convert[ed] Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops’ Pyramid
(or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance.”103 Scalia believed
that there was no support in history or precedent that a violation of the privilege against
compelled-self incrimination would result from a violation of Miranda. 104 Furthermore, he
argued that the majority opinion never explicitly stated that Miranda was required by the
constitution. 105 Scalia also disagreed with the argument that Miranda should be preserved
99
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simply because the decision is well known.106 Hence, Scalia argued that the Supreme Court
should have had no problem with admitting it made a mistake in eliminating the voluntariness
standard for confessions.107
C. Exceptions to Miranda
The Supreme Court’s shifting attitudes regarding the scope of the Fifth Amendment have
led to a diverse range of case law, both analogous and distinctive, that the Court can reflect on
guidance in Salinas v. Texas. Even though Dickerson saved Miranda from being case aside in
2000, the Supreme Court had already carved out numerous exceptions to Miranda’s
requirements in string of precedent after Miranda.108 Three years after Omnibus Crime Control
Act was first enacted, the Supreme Court created an exception where confessions taken in
violation of Miranda could be used at trial for impeachment in Harris v. New York.109 The Court
held that a statement which was inadmissible against the defendant in the prosecution’s case in
chief because defendant had not been advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent prior
to making statement but which otherwise satisfied legal standards of trustworthiness was
properly usable for impeachment purposes to attack credibility of defendant's trial testimony.110
On its face, Harris cuts down Miranda’s power because police could potentially be incentivized
to violate Miranda since any improper statement could nevertheless be admissible if the
defendant testified.
The rise and fall of Miranda continued in New York v. Quarles, where the Court held that
Miranda warnings could be dispensed with all together if there was a concern for public safety
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that justifies immediate questioning.111 In that case, a woman who claimed she had just been
raped said her attacker had just entered a supermarket with a gun.112 When the defendant was
apprehended, the police handcuffed him and then asked him where the gun was before Miranda
warnings were issued, to which he responded “the gun is over there.” 113 The Court created a
narrow exception to Miranda and concluded that the need for answers to questions in situations
posing a threat to pubic safety outweighed the need for Miranda warnings.114 Broadly construed,
the two exceptions in Harris and Quarles could swallow up much of the Miranda rule.
The Supreme Court further cut down the strength and influence of Miranda through a
series of cases dealing with the definition of custody, 115 interrogation, 116 and waiver of
Miranda.117 In one such case, Oregon v. Mathiason, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue
of whether a defendant’s inculpatory statements were admissible under Miranda when he
voluntarily turned himself in at a police station, and when police had not yet Mirandized him and
told him that he was not under arrest.118 The Court held that the statements made at the police
station were admissible even though the defendant made them before police warned him of his
constitutional rights, because while police did question the defendant in a police station, his
freedom of movement was not curtailed in any significant way––he voluntarily went to the
111
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police.119 The Mathiason Court noted that while the police interview with the defendant might
have been coercive, “a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies
simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a ‘coercive environment.”’120
Thus, police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they
question.121 Nor are warnings required simply when questioning takes place in a station house,
or because the questioned person is a suspect.122 Rather, Miranda warnings are required only
where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him in custody.123
The Supreme Court further attempted to minimize the potential negative impact of
Miranda exclusions on effective law enforcement with Oregon v. Elstad.124 There, the Court
addressed Miranda in the context of confessions that were “fruits of the poisonous tree.” 125
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, explained that Miranda is a prophylactic device
intended to protect the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, but errors in administering the
warnings should not lead to the same consequences as infringement on the Fifth Amendment
itself.126 The defendant in Elstad made several incriminating statements to police officers about
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a burglary after he was taken into custody, but prior to being read his Miranda rights.127 When
his rights were eventually read to him, however, he waived them, providing statements that the
government then used against him at trial.128 Justice O’Connor explained that it did not matter
whether the police failed to give Miranda warnings before the defendant’s first confession, so
long as the eventual confession was not coerced.129 It is important to note that even though the
defendant’s subsequent, post-Miranda waiver statements were admissible, the Court held that the
unwarned original admission must be suppressed.130
D. The Use of Silence
1. Supreme Court Precedent
The current discord among the circuit courts primarily stems from the differing
interpretations of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incriminating statements. The
jurisdictions that that have ruled on the admission of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence
of guilt usually do so by employing an extension or curtailment of Supreme Court precedent
from Griffin v. California,131 Doyle v. Ohio,132 Fletcher v. Weir,133 and Jenkins v. Anderson.134
Jenkins and Fletcher represent the law of pre-Miranda silence as it relates to impeachment only.
Doyle and Wainright addressed post-Miranda silence as it relates to both impeachment and
evidence of guilt.135 In these prior decisions, the question of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence has
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evaded review. Salinas v. Texas raises this issue squarely and thrusts into the current and
uncertain state of pre-Miranda jurisprudence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish between the use of silence for impeachment
and as substantive evidence.136 Impeachment is justified on the ground that when a defendant
chooses to testify, he waives his privilege against self-incrimination. 137 Under the Rules of
Evidence, if a defendant testifies to a statement that is inconsistent with one he made earlier, his
credibility can be impeached by the introduction of his prior inconsistent statement.138 If the
defendant’s prior statement was made under oath or at a prior hearing or deposition, the
statement can be admitted as substantive evidence.139
a. Silence at Trial
Over the last half a century, the Supreme Court has been prolific in the area of law
regarding silence in various criminal prosecutions. The Court has ruled on the use of post-arrest,
pre-Miranda silence used for both impeachment and substantive evidence. 140

The most

promising case for Genovevo Salinas, Griffin v. California, involved a prosecutor who expressly
asked the jury to draw a negative inference from the defendant’s choice not to take the witnesses
stand.141 The defendant was charged with murdering a friend who he had been with the night
before.142 The prosecutor remarked that the jury should consider the evidence that the defendant
did not try to disclaim the prosecution’s theory as evidence of guilt in light of the fact that he
would have been the last person to see the decedent alive and would be in the best position to
136
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explain how the night ended, if he were innocent.143 The Court applied this right even before the
defendant’s arrest, reasoning that Miranda warnings are additional protections, but are not
necessary to the existence of the right against self-incrimination.144 The Court ultimately found
that the trial court had violated the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment and
reversed his conviction.145 The Court did not address the government’s use of a defendant’s
silence at his arrest for impeachment but it did, however, create a bright line rule that a
defendant’s silence as a result of his refusal to testify could not be submitted as evidence against
him because it violated the Fifth Amendment.146
The Supreme Court later applied Doyle to determine that the government’s use of a
defendant’s post-arrest and post-Miranda silence as substantive evidence to contradict his
insanity plea violated due process.147 David Greenfield was arrested for sexual battery and he
was read his rights on three separate occasions before he even reached the police station.148 He
stated that he understood his rights and asked for an attorney.149 At trial, the defendant pled not
guilty by reason of insanity.150 The prosecutors, in part by questioning the officers about the
defendant’s demeanor during questioning, and through closing argument, told the jury that the
defendant’s silence proved he was sane enough to understand his rights and to exercise them.151
The defendant was sentenced to life in prison.152 The Supreme Court held that the government
violated the defendant’s due process rights when the prosecutor used the defendant’s post-arrest,

143

Id. at 610–11.
Id. at 614.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 614–15.
147
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986).
148
Id. at 286.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 287.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 286–87.
144

21

post-Miranda silence for either impeachment or case-in-chief purposes. 153 Specifically, the
Court stated that the Miranda warnings include an implicit promise that a defendant’s silence
will not be used against him and thus could not be used to contradict the defendant’s sanity.154
b. Silence Arising After Both an Arrest and the Receipt of a Miranda
Warning, for Impeachment and Substantive Evidence
Ten years after Miranda, the Supreme Court addressed a case with comparable facts to
Salinas, where the issue arose whether a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence could be
used for impeachment purposes if the defendant testified at trial. 155 In Doyle v. Ohio, the
defendants were charged with selling marijuana to an undercover informant. 156 At trial, the
defendants testified that the informant framed them and the prosecution impeached them on
cross-examination by questioning why they failed to tell their exculpatory story after they had
been arrested and given Miranda warnings.157 The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell,
announced that that such use was impermissible, explaining that prosecutors are not allowed to
comment on a defendant’s silence to impeach any testimony he may give at trial if the silence
arose after officers had read him his Miranda rights.158 The Court explained that the silence
could not be used even for impeachment purposes because, “while . . . the Miranda warnings
contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any
person who receives the warnings.” 159 It would therefore be “fundamentally unfair and a
deprivation of due process” to allow the use of the warned arrestee's silence to be used even for
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impeaching an explanation first offered at trial.160 Furthermore, the Court cautioned that the
silence after Miranda is inherently ambiguous because it may just be due to the Miranda
warning’s admonition itself.161 The Court prohibited the use of post-Miranda silence to impeach
a defendant as it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.162
In Doyle v. Ohio, the Court announced an exception to an exception to the general rule
that a defendant’s silence cannot be used for any purpose, and prohibited impeachment with a
defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.163 However, the Court evaluated this case under
due process grounds, and not Fifth Amendment. But relevant to the analysis here is the Court’s
belief that, even though the defendant was not compelled in anyway to speak or stay silent, his
decision to remain silent was induced by Miranda warnings.

This could also apply to a

defendant who has not been arrested but is unresponsive during police contact because anything
he might say would be incriminating.
c. Silence Arising Prior to Arrest and Receipt of a Miranda warning
In 1980, the Supreme Court cautiously approached the issue of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence, but deliberately left the question unanswered.

The Jenkins v. Anderson decision

addressed the issue of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence only for impeachment purposes.164 There,
the Court allowed the prosecution to use pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach a
defendant’s credibility when he testifies at trial.165 The defendant in Jenkins stabbed a man to
death and fled the scene of the crime, only to be apprehended two weeks later.166 At trial, the
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defendant asserted that he acted in self-defense.167 The prosecutor then questioned the defendant
as to why he did not explain to the arresting officers that he acted in self-defense. 168 The
prosecution subsequently used this silence in summation to argue that the defendant would have
immediately reported this claim of self-defense when authorities approached him if he had, in
fact, acted in self-defense.169 The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether the prosecutor’s commentary on his silence was
a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment. 170 The ruling in Jenkins was limited to
impeachment use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.171 The Jenkins holding in some ways can
be characterized as incomplete, as it does not address the Fifth Amendment rights of a defendant
who never takes the stand, and whether this pre-arrest silence is privileged in any situation.
First, the Court in Jenkins stated that the rule outlined in Griffin that a prosecutor could
comment on a defendant exercising his right to remain silent at trial did not apply because,
Jenkins voluntarily chose to testify in his own defense.172 Under a constitutional analysis, the
Court found that the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, did not protect the defendant in that case because impeachment with pre-arrest
silence “follow[ed] the defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advance[d]
the truth-finding function of the criminal trial.”173 Moreover, the Court said that, because the
police had not read the defendant his Miranda rights, Doyle’s estoppel theory, 174 did not
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apply.175 The Court held that the defendant's pre-arrest silence could be used against him for
impeachment purposes, as no governmental action induced the defendant to remain silent before
his arrest, but made clear that state courts were free to outlaw the practice through their own
Rules of Evidence.176 The Court reached its ruling since a defendant who takes the stand makes
a decision “to cast aside his cloak of silence and advance the truth-finding function of the
criminal trial.”177 The Court also held that the use of the silence to impeach his credibility did
not deny him fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 178 Neither the
Doyle nor Jenkins decisions, however, decided the issue of whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence is admissible where the defendant does not testify, and cast aside his “cloak of silence.”
d. Silence Arising After an Arrest But Before the Receipt of a Miranda Warning
In a case with substantially similar facts to Jenkins, the Fletcher Court held that the
impeachment use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence did not violate due process.179
In Fletcher v. Weir, the Court was faced with the question of whether the Fifth Amendment
precluded the use of such silence for impeachment during cross-examination about post-arrest
silence when a defendant willingly takes the stand.180 At trial for murder charges stemming from
a stabbing, Fletcher took the stand in his own defense and claimed he acted in self-defense.181
Similar to the defendant in Jenkins, Fletcher fled the scene of the crime and only offered his
exculpatory story for the first time on the stand.182 But unlike the defendant in Jenkins, here the
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defendant was silent prior to receiving his Miranda warnings, but after he was arrested.183 The
prosecution, on cross-examination, inquired why he never offered the explanation before.184 The
defense argued that the arrest triggered the defendant’s right to remain silent, and therefore the
prosecutor’s questioning of the defendant’s ulterior motive for silence violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.185 The Court did not agree and plainly stated that
courts that had been improperly extending Doyle beyond its scope to protect a defendant’s
silence during the period immediately after his arrest but before Miranda warnings were
issued.186 The Court concluded that in the absence of the affirmative assurances embodied in
Miranda, it is not improper for the state to permit the cross-examination.187
2. Circuit Split Regarding the Evidentiary Use of Pre-Arrest, Pre-Miranda
Silence
Although the Miranda decision established that a defendant has the right to remain silent,
it has not provided any more definitive guidance on the current subject. Despite the proliferation
of Supreme Court cases about the use of a defendant’s silence at trial, the courts are split on the
constitutionality of admitting pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt.
Additionally, stemming from the deep confusion over the limits of the Fifth Amendment
and the reach of Miranda protection in the federal courts, the circuit courts are split on whether
the government can use post-arrest silence in its case in chief, where the defendant has not been
given Miranda warnings. 188 Because the Supreme Court would likely need to address these
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distinct issues separately, this Comment will only address the split regarding pre-arrest, preMiranda silence.
Turning to the topic of this Comment, four courts of appeals allow the use of pre-arrest,
pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt.189 The Ninth and D.C. Circuits only allow
the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.190 Alternatively, the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits prohibit the prosecution from using any pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt.191
The circuits that prohibit this evidence rely primarily on the theory enunciated in Griffin v.
California, namely that commenting on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the “inquisitorial
system of criminal justice,” which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.192 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has also indicated that pre-Miranda silence is likely not admissible.193 These
cases generally hinge on whether the prosecution introduces the defendant’s silence solely for
impeachment purposes or as substantive evidence of guilt.
In Coppola v. Powell, the First Circuit reached the conclusion that a defendant’s pre-
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arrest, pre-Miranda silence should not be used as substantive evidence of guilt, and the court’s
reasoning is representative of the line of cases that precede and succeed it.194 In this case, the
police went to the defendant’s home in an attempt to investigate a recent rape.195 Before he was
arrested or Mirandized, the defendant stated, “I grew up on the streets of Providence, Rhode
Island. And if you think I'm going confess to you, you're crazy.”196 At trial, the prosecution
introduced this statement in a ploy to have the jurors infer that an innocent person would not
object to speaking to police to clear his name.197 The petitioner was convicted and, on appeal,
the First Circuit found that the district court erred in admitting the silence.198 The court held that
the petitioner’s statement was a clear invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to silence and
therefore the admission was in violation of his right against self-incrimination and that the error
was not “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”199
In United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, the defendant refused to talk in a non-custodial
setting about murders with which he was later charged, which was used against him at trial.200
The Illinois Appellate Court found such use to be inappropriate on appeal, but nonetheless
deemed the error as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.201 The Seventh Circuit202 held that the
right to remain silent is a constitutional right to say nothing about the allegations against oneself,
and though Miranda warnings can provide additional protection, they are not necessary to the
existence of the right.203 The court specifically drew comparison to Griffin, even though the
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silence in that case happened at trial and was not the product of out of court questioning, and
found that the right applied equally to the defendant’s silence before trial and arrest.204
In United States v. Hernandez, the defendant objected to the prosecution’s use of his
post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in the case against him.205 The trial court admitted the evidence
of the silence.206 Relying on Savory v. Lane, the Seventh Circuit determined that the government
could not use a defendant's pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt in its case-inchief. 207 The court concluded, however, that the admission of testimony concerning the
defendant’s post-arrest silence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.208
The Tenth Circuit similarly does not allow the prosecution to comment on a defendant’s
pre-arrest silence. 209 In United States v. Burson, I.R.S. agents testified at trial about the
defendant’s refusal to answer questions about his finances prior to his arrest for tax evasion.210
The court relied on the legal principle announced in Griffin, using the rule to prevent the
prosecution from commenting on any Fifth Amendment right the defendant had chosen to
exercise.211 The court interpreted the Griffin precedent to mean that any comment on silence
during trial is inappropriate, even though the exact language of Griffin is limited to prohibiting
commentary on a defendant’s failure to take the stand and testify in in his own defense.212
By contrast, the Fourth 213 and Eleventh 214 Circuits have found that admitting a
defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence for use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief is not a
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constitutional violation. While not going as far, the Third Circuit215 indicated it would agree
with these sister circuits and would permit the government to use such silence as substantive
evidence of guilt if the issue presented itself in the future.

These courts reason that the

protections against self-incrimination do not apply before a suspect is arrested and has been
given Miranda warnings because there is no official compulsion to speak and the Fifth
Amendment does not protect in such a situation.216
These circuits cumulatively held that, because the government had not yet implicitly
assured the defendant that his silence would not be used against him, it was admissible since
Miranda was not required at that point.217 Notwithstanding the fact that Miranda’s purpose was
to restore the balance of power between a suspect and police in custodial interrogations by
informing defendants of their rights, judges with particularly strong views on individual rights
believe Miranda to be a prophylactic device to overprotect a citizen’s constitutional right not to
incriminate oneself.218
The Eleventh Circuit similarly holds that the prosecution does not violate the Fifth
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Amendment by commenting on a defendant’s pre-arrest silence. 219 Three defendants were
arrested for a multitude of drug offenses upon entering Miami from a trip to Colombia after a
customs agent found cocaine in their suitcases. 220 While the customs agent discovered the
cocaine hidden in the false bottom of the suitcases and in false aerosol hairspray cans, the
defendants, one of whom plead guilty prior to trial, showed no surprise or reaction at all during
the encounter, and explicitly testified that nothing was said during the search and that one of the
defendants had a “dead pan” reaction, expressionless demeanor.221 Government counsel used the
two defendants’ pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to insinuate that they were guilty and that they
made a prior agreement made to stay quiet if their plan was foiled.222 By relying on Jenkins223
and Fletcher,224 the court immediately dismissed the argument that silence either before or after
arrest but prior to Miranda warnings was improper.225 The Eleventh Circuit took the position
that Miranda warnings were necessary to trigger the protections of the Fifth Amendment.226
In United States v. Zanabria,227 the Fifth Circuit allowed the prosecution to comment on
a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.228 The prosecution presented a customs agent that
testified that the defendant never mentioned an exculpatory story prior to trial where his wife
219

United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1565–66.
221
Id. at 1565.
222
Id. at 1568.
223
See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235 (1980) (allowing the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence for
impeachment purposes if the defendant takes the stand in his own defense).
224
See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 609 (1982) (holding that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is permissible to
impeach a defendant on cross-examination who takes the stand in his own defense).
225
Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1567–68 (citing Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 231; Fletcher, 445 U.S. at 603 (“We note initially that
some of Inspector Schor’s testimony, even if construed as comments on Vila’s silence, do not raise constitutional
difficulties. The government may comment on a defendant’s silence if it occurred prior to the time that he is
arrested and given his Miranda warnings . . . In addition, the government may comment on a defendant’s silence
when it occurs after arrest, but before Miranda warnings are given.”)).
226
Id. at 1568.
227
United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996).
228
But see United States v. Ashley, 664 F.3d 602, 604 n.6 (5th Cir. 2011) (“This court has taken the position that the
prosecution can use a non-testifying defendant’s pre-arrest silence as long as the silence is not induced by, or a
response to, the actions of a government agent. Other circuits have interpreted Zanabria as our fully endorsing use
of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, but the issue is unresolved until this court is faced with a case in which silence is
induced by, or is a response to, government action.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
220

31

testified in his defense.229 Post-Zanabria cases230 have also held that “a prosecutor's reference to
a non-testifying defendant's pre-arrest silence does not violate the privilege against selfincrimination if the defendant's silence is not induced by, or a response to, the actions of the
government.”231
Notwithstanding these circuits that do not find a constitutional violation, the Supreme
Court’s silence precedence discussed in Part I-D-1 suggests that pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence
is inadmissible and contrary to the intent of the Fifth Amendment, and as, such should be
excluded from comment by prosecutors or other introductions as evidence of guilt.

The

reasoning of United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane should influence the Supreme Court’s ultimate
decision in Salinas, as the Seventh Circuit there correctly excluded such evidence.232 In that
case, the court recognized that since that the defendant relied on his right to remain silent,
Illinois’ argument that the use of his silence to imply guilt did not present a constitutional issue
was “nothing short of incredible, given the language of our Constitution and the interpretation it
has been consistently given.”233 The Court swiftly rejected the applicability of the Jenkins and
Fletcher as well, as those cases dealt with silence used for impeachment only.234
3. State Courts
State courts have not reached consistent results on the admissibility of such silence.
Although the majority of courts to face the issue have ruled that the prosecution may not
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introduce pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence during its case-in-chief,235 these courts usually discuss
the implications of such silence under their own state constitutions and rules of evidence. Some
Courts find that this silence does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.236 Therefore, the state
court split is not addressed here as it is outside the scope of this Comment.237 .
4. Salinas v. Texas in the Supreme Court
Thirty-three years ago, the Supreme Court explicitly stated in Jenkins v. Anderson that it
was declining to address whether the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence would
violate the Fifth Amendment. 238 In 2013, the Supreme Court finally granted certification in
Salinas v. Texas, deciding to rule on the circuit split regarding this very issue.239 The defendantsubject of the case is Genovevo Salinas, a man who was questioned about the murder of two
brothers in 1992.240 Salinas cooperated with police and answered questions for almost an hour,
but looked down at the floor and stayed silent instead of answering a question as to whether a
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shotgun recovered from his home would match shells found at the crime scene.241 He was later
charged with murder after a witness told the police Salinas had confessed to murdering the
victims.242 After managing to evade arrest for over 15 years, he was captured in 2007 eventually
tried for murder. 243 In an extremely brief opinion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
acknowledged that neither it nor the Supreme Court had decided the issue at bar. 244 When
deciding the case, the lower Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston 245 relied on Justice Stevens’
concurrence in Jenkins, and on appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with that
approach.246 In Jenkins, Justice Stevens explained that the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination is irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent even when he is under no
official compulsion to speak.247 The Salinas court used that argument undermine the reasoning
of the Fifth Amendment by concluding that the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was not protected
by the Fifth Amendment because it was not compelled.248
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Salinas v. Texas on April 17, 2013.249 The
Petitioner’s argument relied on a broad interpretation of the rule announced in Griffin v.
California that prevents the government from arguing that a defendant’s guilt may be surmised
by his silence because an innocent person would deny law enforcement’s accusations. Similarly,
in footnote 37 in Miranda, the Supreme Court said that if a suspect in custody invokes his right
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to remain silent, that fact may not be used as evidence against him.250 The petitioner urged that
because Americans know they have a right to remain silent, to allow the government to make
insinuations based on silence in a non-custodial setting merely creates a trap for the unwary that
do not know that the police will use their silence as evidence of guilt.251
Alternatively, the Respondent’s case rested on a narrow interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment based on the facts of the case. Respondent requested a ruling where, absent an
unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent, a defendant’s failure to answer a question
during a noncustodial, voluntary interview should not be protected by the Fifth Amendment, for
it reveals the defendant’s guilty conscience.252 The Respondent also offered that silence used in
a noncustodial setting is voluntary in the sense that the defendant can say he does not want to
answer anymore questions.

This would be enough to invoke the privilege against self-

incrimination, 253 but silence alone might have many explanations, including that the suspect
could be contemplating an exculpatory story in his head, or is expressing momentary shock that
the police know more information and have evidence than the suspect initially thought.254
The Justices expressed considerable skepticism to both arguments.255 Worried about the
prosecutor using such silence, Justice Sotomayor stated that silence as an admission of guilt is
“such a radical position.” 256 The Justice stated “it’s a little scary to me that an unanswered
question is evidence of guilt.” On the other hand, Justice Scalia posed that mere silence would
indicate that the suspect did not want to speak so the evidence would not be probative. The
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Respondent countered that silence could indicate that the suspect is having difficulty crafting an
exculpatory response and that he is worried about the questions.257
Much of the argument also focused on whether the protection against self-incrimination
requires an affirmative invocation of the right to remain silent in this context.258 To require an
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination mistakenly assumes that this provision of
the Fifth Amendment is procedurally analogous to other non-self-executing rights. For example,
a defendant who wishes to have counsel present during custodial interrogation must ask for
counsel and the officers must have a lawyer be brought to the stationhouse to satisfy the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel during questioning.259 Similarly, the Sixth Amendment provides
the right to “assistance of counsel” before trial. 260 A defendant must ask for a lawyer if he
desires one, although the right to counsel will default to the appointment of one by the court if
the defendant does not request one. 261 Securing counsel thus involves the actions of other
people. Similarly, a defendant has the right to a trial by jury for a felony under the Sixth
Amendment.262 But if the defendant wishes to waive this right, he must do so in writing with the
court’s approval and government consent.263 A defendant who seeks pre-trial release has the
right to prove that he should be granted bail.264 A defendant also has the right to ask the court
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for permission to represent himself in a criminal proceeding pro-se.265 These rights are not selfexecuting, as permission from the court or the involvement of another party is inherently needed
to carry out these rights. The government’s argument is therefore undermined by the fact that
the right to remain silent exists even with the lack of any resources in any given moment, for
remaining silent is in fact the exercise of the right that is protected. Intuitively so, the privilege
against self-incrimination during pre-arrest, pre-Miranda questioning does not and should not
require a communication from the suspect.
II. Analysis
In Salinas v. Texas, the question remains as to the proper, constitutional treatment of prearrest, pre-Miranda silence that defendants like Mr. Salinas appear to invoke.266 Respecting the
right to remain silent in these situations comports with the policy considerations outlined in
Miranda v. Arizona and the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment precedence on the selfincrimination clause and right to remain silent. The right to remain silent should only be
subjected to prosecutorial comment if such comment falls within the exceptions that the Court
has already carved out. In the absence of such an exception, the Court should look to its past
precedent for guidance. This Comment has discussed the evolution of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence that the Court can rely on in Salinas to find that the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence as substantive evidence of guilt is unconstitutional.
As comprehensive as the Supreme Court’s silence precedent is, some cases are easily
distinguishable from Salinas v. Texas and warrant addressing first. Doyle, Jenkins, and Fletcher
personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond is appropriate unless such release will not reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community.
§3142(b).
265
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analyze silence for impeachment and are not determinative as to whether silence as substantive
evidence of guilt is appropriate.267 Jenkins permits pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach a
defendant’s testimony at trial.268 The Jenkins holding was born out of evidentiary law on
impeachment, where anyone who takes the witness stand puts his own credibility at issue and is
subject to impeachment.269 In Salinas, Mr. Salinas did not testify, nonetheless, the prosecution
used his pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence. Although the Jenkins decision
represents a more liberal treatment of silence, the holding does not require a contrary result than
what is presently suggested.270 The Jenkins Court’s respect for the legitimacy of impeachment
practice encouraged their approval of the use of the silence––a consideration not present in
Salinas because Mr. Salinas did not testify and his silence was not used to impeach him.271
In Doyle v. Ohio, the Court barred a prosecutor from using a defendant’s post-arrest,
post-Miranda silence for impeachment.272 The prosecutor in Doyle impeached the defendant’s
exculpatory story that was told for the first time at trial by cross-examining him on his failure to
have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings.273 The Court noted the implicit guarantees
of Miranda warnings encourage the defendant to remain silent and thus estop comment on postMiranda silence.274 While similar concerns arise in the pre-Miranda context–the defendant’s
familiarly with the right to remain silent causing him to stay silent–Salinas is unique from
Doyle.275 Because Mr. Salinas’ silence occurring before Miranda warnings, he never received
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the implicit guarantees that were discussed in Doyle.276 Therefore, the Court’s holding in Doyle
is inapplicable to the Petitioner’s argument in Salinas, and this Comment’s suggestion, that pre
arrest, pre-Miranda silence should be protected under the Fifth Amendment and not simply as a
result of the recitation of Miranda warnings.277
Although Fletcher v. Weir found no violation of the Fifth Amendment when the
testifying defendant was cross-examined on his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, the decision
was likewise based on impeachment law.278 Even though the Court found that the defendant was
not protected until Miranda warnings were issued, the Court did not discuss silence being used
as substantive evidence; therefore, the holding does not speak to the present issue.279
When following the Supreme Court’s other holding on silence to its logical conclusion,
the Court must find that Salinas falls on equal ground with Griffin v. California and extend that
holding to prohibit the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt.280
There are, however, key differences between Salinas, involving pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence
and Griffin, involving post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. Griffin’s broad holding stated that a
prosecutor could not comment on a defendant’s choice not to testify that trial, a form of postarrest, post-Miranda silence.281 The prosecutor asked the jury to infer from the defendant’s
refusal to take the stand that he was guilty because an innocent person would have denied a false
accusation.282 Without this prohibition, either decision the defendant in Griffin made, to answer
the state’s questions and possibly incriminate himself, or remain silent and be harmed by
implication, forced him to become a witness against himself.
276
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The Salinas Court can draw an analogy between Griffin and Salinas because Mr. Salinas
faced the same predicament that the Court ruled unconstitutional in Griffin. Although Mr.
Salinas had not been Mirandized during the questioning that resulted in his silence, unlike the
defendant in Griffin, the difference is irrelevant.283 The Griffin rule did not evolve from a
concern of coercion to speak, but rather the worry that a witness is unable to prevent himself
from providing the government with evidence to use against him if he exercises his right not to
testify.284 That reasoning is directly relevant to the situation presented in Salinas, where a
suspect who remains silent is unwillingly giving the government evidence against him in the
process. The Seventh Circuit recognized this in Savory v. Lane when it eliminated the
distinction between pre and post-Miranda silence and prohibited both at trial.285 It relied on
Griffin’s rule that silence should not be evidence of guilt at trial and thus, found that silence in
investigatory questioning could not be used since there is a “a constitutional right to say nothing
at all about the allegations.”286
Although the Supreme Court has already heavily limited the scope of Miranda’s
protections,287 it should recognize in Salinas that criminal procedure rules still weigh in favor of
protecting primary rights against government power in criminal cases.288 The Fifth Amendment
“serves as a protection to the innocent as well as the guilty.”289 Miranda itself did not limit the
right to remain silent solely at trial or custodial questioning.290 The right to remain silent applies
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even in the absence of custodial interrogation.291 Regardless if an individual has been arrested or
not, the principle remains the same: “while the police have the right to request citizens to answer
voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to
answer.”292 This does not negate the power of the Miranda warning and its admonition to
remain silent–rather it reinforces the notion that even without Miranda warnings, a suspect
should be able to remain silent by relying on the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, a privilege that is merely alerted to arrestees in Miranda warnings as a precaution
against compelled confessions.
In his concurring opinion in Jenkins, Justice Stevens suggested that the key to analyzing
the right against self-incrimination is whether the person was under an official compulsion to
speak.293 If the Court in Salinas allows prosecutors to use silence as evidence of guilt, it would
force suspects to speak during questioning, producing another type of a compelled confession
that has long-since been banned by the Court.294 When an officer asks an individual, who may
or may not know he is a suspect, about potential criminal activity, the situation presents the
person with two options: to speak–which is generally ill-advised by defense attorneys–295or to
stay silent. If silence can then be used as evidence of guilt, it creates a punishment for exercising
the right not to incriminate oneself and a compulsion to speak. Invoking Miranda rights during
later custodial interrogation would be futile, for the Miranda protections afforded to a suspect are
cut down if they are administered after a suspect has already incriminated himself in the process
291
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of remaining silent. This double-edged sword cannot be constitutionally permissible as it is a
variation of the “cruel trilemma” already abolished with the adoption of the Fifth Amendment.
The burden of prosecution at trial, to prove an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, rests
with the state instead of with the defendant.296 But, if prosecutors can use silence in the face of
accusatory questions as a sign of guilt, then the burden shifts to the suspect in making the
government’s case and impairs the privilege. This practice turns a back to the interests protected
in the Fifth Amendment and implicitly condones officers questioning suspects before formerly
placing them under arrest, to purposely to circumvent Miranda’s protections.
Because the impetus behind a defendant’s silence can be ambiguous, the Salinas Court
may opt for a compromise to allow the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in situations if
Court deems the defendant’s silence to be a tacit response to questioning that proves guilt, rather
than an invocation of the right to remain silent and reliance on Miranda warnings. The analysis
of similar Fourth and Fifth Amendment suppression issues in federal courts makes it likely such
a consideration would be undertaken through a motion to suppress, or a possible preliminary
hearing in front of a magistrate judge, where the defendant would bear the burden of proof in
showing a violation of rights causing the necessity for the suppression of evidence. 297
Unfortunately, such a test would create administrative problems and open the floodgates to a
variety of permutations where the defendant’s motive for remaining silent is unclear. The
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motivation behind a suspect’s choice to remain silent can be a result of a multitude of factors,
including his likely familiarity with the popular Miranda warnings and the Fifth Amendment.298
An added difficulty arises when deciding from whose perspective silence should be evaluated.
To view the silence from law enforcement’s perception would certainly pose a significant burden
to defendants wishing to rebut the presumption of guilt. To avoid this quagmire, 299 a more
tenable standard would forbid the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, making an invocation
of the right unnecessary.
In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court should easily be able to refute the
reasoning of the courts that decline to protect un-Mirandized silence.300 The Fifth Amendment's
protections cannot turn on when law enforcement chooses to read a list of judicially created
statements that were merely intended to protect a substantive right. To argue that the right does
not manifest until warnings are given would nullify the privilege against self-incrimination,
which existed in American jurisprudence long before Miranda v. Arizona was decided in
1966.301 Thus, the recitation of the Miranda warning does not invoke the privileges and
protections of the Fifth Amendment, for the right innately exist through the Bill of Rights.302
Miranda warnings inform unaware defendants of their rights and safeguard the core
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constitutional right protected by the self-incrimination clause by counterbalancing a suspect’s
natural inclination to speak to officers in intimidating situations.303 The warnings do not trigger
the force of the Fifth Amendment; they merely recite the existence of a right that is present
regardless of whether a warning is given.304
Finally, the justification that prosecutorial comment on pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is
indicative of guilt is fundamentally flawed. The Court has already held that silence during and
after arrest is ambiguous and irrelevant to establish guilt.305 Silence is no more probative of guilt
because it takes place before a suspect is read his Miranda rights.306 People may honestly believe
that they have the right to remain silent when confronted with pre-arrest questioning, so it is
impossible to conclude that a failure to speak is more consistent with guilt than with innocence.
III. Conclusion
The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled confessions and self-incrimination––a
liberty that is rooted in American Jurisprudence.

The Supreme Court has protected these

inalienable rights in the mass of cases leading up to and since the seminal decision, Miranda v.
Arizona. The trend of using pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt
causes an egregious constitutional violation. Looking forward to the pending case, I hope that
the Supreme Court will appreciate the implications of this practice that has been jeopardizing
defendant’s rights and finally strike down the constitutionally offensive practice with its
forthcoming decision in Salinas v. Texas.
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The Salinas Court has the unique ability to make a vast impact on criminal procedure and
reinforce the goals of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. In light of the rich history behind the
evolution and interpretation of the privilege, this Comment predicts that the Salinas Court will
therefore reverse the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In doing so, the Court
would join the circuits that recognize that the Fifth Amendment protects the right to remain silent
during pre-arrest, pre-Miranda questioning.
This Comment argues that the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked immediately
whenever an individual is faced with investigatory questioning by law enforcement for the right
innately exists through the Bill of Rights. A clear rule that pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence
cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt would ensure that defendants are not manipulated
into forfeiting their constitutional rights. When faced with police questioning, one should be
abled to exercise the right to remain silent without the worry that his silence will be held against
him at trial. Such a decision would not require an upheaval of precedent, rather it would clearly
support the Court’s prior decisions, including Miranda v. Arizona, that protect the citizen against
compelled confessions and self-incrimination, which is the heart of the Fifth Amendment.
Moreover, law enforcement and the prosecution would not be disadvantaged by such a rule. If a
defendant testifies in his own defense, prosecutors may still validly impeach the defendant’s
testimony with pre-arrest silence, as allowed in Jenkins v. Anderson.
But if the Court allows the use of this silence, the Court will divest citizens of the
protections supposedly afforded by one of the most important constitutional protections we have
as–– “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”
and sanction the use of compelled confessions, untethering the Fifth Amendment from the very
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purpose for which it was enacted.307 Unless this practice is ruled unconstitutional, the threat
remains that this silence represents an implicit confession and defendants like Genovevo Salinas
will be convicted based on prejudicial evidence that the jury should never considered.
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